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"But this is business!" And "business is business." Thus are ethics and humanitarianism put in their place-ostracized from the company which feels only discomfort in their presence. Business is hard? Business is cruel? It must be so in order to
achieve maximum economic general welfare. If I conduct my business within the letter
of the law, the standard of propriety is only what is good for my business, what will increase my rewards. Such individual striving for greater individual reward will result in
maximum production at minimum cost. Harm which some may suffer as a consequence
is a regrettable but inevitable cost of this greater good. Other institutions, private
charity, public relief, etc., may alleviate such harms, but business must not be distracted thereby. Of course, the law must place some limits on individual striving;
for the alternative is anarchy. The law must protect my "property." It must protect
my efforts and investment against piracy by others. It must protect my business
against "unfair" methods of competition. But it must not hamper my business. It
must not prevent the contribution to general welfare which is surely made by my efforts
to serve my own interest. This is a comforting philosophy, both for him who likes to
think that his conscience might otherwise be troubled by his business methods and for
him who has no conscience. Each may pursue his ends in the sublime confidence that
his conduct is beyond reproach. Business is business.
The soothing quality of this philosophy lies, however, in the complete acceptance of
its basic premise as a universal. And the devotion of some persons to empiricism makes
such acceptance by them difficult. Some, indeed, question whether the result is worth
the price; they have different notions on what constitutes general welfare. But others,
without questioning the truth of the premise in general, find that, at times, in some
phases, under some circumstances or for some periods, individual selfishness conflicts
with and does not promote general welfare. They urge empiric verification of the effects
of specific business methods; and then urge action based on such verification. Action
by the businessmen themselves, for business may be a profession just as surely as a
profession is business, and action by law,-to supervise business practices and to eliminate those which are injurious to general welfare even though they may serve the immediate ends of individuals. The public interest is paramount, all agree. The differences bear on those smaller issues, what promotes and what injures that interest.
I put out headache pills which I christen "Merry-go-Round"--thus enabling the
sufferer to associate the cure and the illness with the least mental strain. I have ample
financial backing; and I conduct extensive advertising campaigns. The investment in
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advertising brings great financial return. People have headaches and they instinctively
think of "Merry-go-Round." Even when they do not react instinctively, they are
quickly told by bill board, newspaper, radio, circular. Any druggist can probably prepare the pills and sell them at one tenth the price or less. Suppose one does. Suppose
he labels them "Merry-go-Round Pills." He profits by the sales; his customers profit.
But I lose. Which way lies the public interest?
A distributor of gasoline in Middletown finds that he is not selling half of the gasoline that his existing facilities can dispense. He considers lowering his price but fears
trouble from his source of supply. He hits upon the idea of a lottery. With each five
gallons of gasoline he gives the buyer a ticket. At the end of the year, the holder of the
lucky ticket will be given a new automobile "free."
A clothing manufacturer in New York is doing extremely well. His friends attribute
his success to his personality. He is very sociable and seems to become a friend of every
buyer in his line. He entertains them royally when they come to town, as every good
friend should. He is solicitous of their every need. He remembers their birthdays and
their wedding anniversaries; and finds a number of other reasons for "remembering"
them with a slight token of friendship. His competitors envy his "personality."
A shirt manufacturer in Boonville, Ricardo & Co., is hungry for more business. A
representative of a national chain store offers an order for half of Ricardo's capacity, at a
stated price. Ricardo remonstrates that the price is 15% less than his price to his other
customers and is hardly sufficient to cover his cost of production. The chain store
representative starts for the door. He cannot pay more because he must sell the shirts
at sixty-nine cents apiece. That is the store's customary price. The shirts are sold almost at cost in order to attract customers. Any increase in the price above sixty-nine
cents would destroy its effectiveness as a "leader." He would like to place his order with
Ricardo, but if that is not possible, he can place it elsewhere at an even lower price.
Ricardo accepts the order. He then starts an intensive search for a means of shaving
his costs-a reduction in wages, a speed up of production, elimination of soap or towels
for his employees, a little carelessness about his insurance, omission of some operation
where possible, use of goods of somewhat lesser quality for customers who are "easy,"
home work perhaps, a little less attention to the youthful appearance of applicants
for work or, perhaps, a purposeful system of apprenticeship, or "learning." Which of
these practices constitute "unfair competition"? Is the chain store's hard bargaining
immune from the charge?
Once religion supplied the answers to such questions and exercised the control required to steer individual enterprise within the boundaries of current notions of general welfare. Once, also, industrial self government, with and without the aid of municipal law,-the guilds-enforced the group interest in individual activity., But these
controls were things of the past, when cases of the kind stated above began to arise.
The new philosophy was that free individual enterprise provided its own automatic
controls. External legal controls were to be reduced to a minimum. Yet external legal
controls of a kind were inescapable. Some were provided by the private civil action in
tort; some by special legislation.
Dr. Derenberg set himself a limited task and performed it with distinction. He
undertook a "reconsideration and restatement" of the "governing principles ' 2 of the
law developed by the American courts in the field commonly called, in the language of
zSee Hamilton, The Ancient Maxim Caveat Emptor 40 Yale L. J. 1133 (1933).
2P.ix.
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the digests, "trade-mark infringement and unfair competition." The book is written
with sustained enthusiasm and is easy to read. The legal analysis is done in a careful
and workmanlike manner.3 The author has not "read and cited more cases in order to
make more sentences." He discusses and cites cases selectively,--for their significance
as indications of a point of view, of a trend, of a value. While American law is his concern, he gives us frequent glimpses of foreign law for comparison or contrast. The text
is surrounded with luxurious trimmings: numerous citations to legal literature other
than judicial opinions, an elaborate and useful index, tables of cases and of trademarks or trade names mentioned in the text, and appendices containing the federal
statutes and regulations, the statutes and regulations of the forty-eight states and the
international conventions and treaties, relating to trade-marks, and the rules of practice of the Federal Trade Commission.
The author consciously restricted himself to a study of legal doctrine. He did not
stray beyond the boundaries of orthodox legal literature. The development of the
legal doctrine is not, therefore, integrated with economic history or with social or economic thought outside the law books. There is no investigation of the action and
counteraction of doctrine and business practice, of legal principle and business consequences. The study is confined to a small segment of business practices-those used
in making and promoting sales. The major portion of the book deals with trade-mark
infringement. One relatively short chapter deals with Federal Trade Commission cases
which have gone to the courts. The rest of the study is devoted to judicially condemned trade practices, such as "passing off," misappropriation of another's trade
values and disparagement. A little is told about resale price maintenance and the
"fair trade" acts. The-author's standards of criticism are common-sense judgments
stemming from a private property orientation. The commercial advantage of one who
has expended money or effort to achieve it is a property intere st which should be legally
protected. Trade symbols should be given the fullest possible protection. And false
representations which may injure another's business should be ground for civil action
by the other. The effects upon competitive enterprise,4 the fitness of the judicial
machinery for the job of supervising trade practices and the possibilities of other forms
of control are apparently beyond the scope of the study.
Given his standards of criticism, the author commends highly the Supreme Court's
decision in InternationalNews v. Associated Press.s The pragmatic considerations advanced in the dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Brandeis do not disturb him. Like Mr.
3 There are, perhaps, occasional slips, as, e.g., the statement on p. 27 that "with regard to
the validity of a patent there is an old established rule that a decision of one federal court is
binding upon all other federal courts before which the same question may be brought later."
And there may be differences of opinion as to the interpretation of some cases. For example,
I do not quite see the alleged conflict between Prestonettes Inc. v. Coty and Bourjois & Co. v.
Katzel (pp. 57-72) or between Federal Trade Commission v. Raladam and Federal Trade
Commission v. R. F. Keppel Bros. (pp. x66, 179). And while I would not belittle the extent of
judicial interference with the Federal Trade Commission, I like to have it recognized that the
Commission has itself strayed far from its primary function as an instrument of anti-trust
policy.
4 See e.g., Appendix E,"Some Arguments in Favor of Trade-Mark Infringement and 'Unfair Trading,'" in Chamberlin, The Theory of Monopolistic Competition (1933). See also
Cohen, Transcendental Nonsense and the Functional Approach, 35 Col. L. Rev. 8og, 84-17
(93s).
5[248 U.S. 215 (igiS)], pp. 90--96.
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Justice Pitney, he does not even refer to the practical problem which faced the International News and caused it to resort to the practice condemned by the Court. Likewise, the author regrets the decisions in Gothamn Music Service v. Denton-Haskins,6
Associated Press v. KVOS (in the District Court)7 and Clheney Bros. v. Doris Silk
Corp.8 In the Gotham case the plaintiff "had revived an old uncopyrighted song [previously known as 'Gambler's Blues'] and had reintroduced as 'St. James' Infirmary
Blues' ..... One year after plaintiff made the song known again, the defendant also
started to publish the song under the name 'St. James'Infirmary or Gambler's Blues.'"
The New York Court of Appeals refused to enjoin the defendant. Dr. Derenberg commends the dissenting opinion of Chief Judge Crane who saw no difference between the
name of the song and the name "Uneeda" for crackers or "Cremo" for cigars. Judge
Crane wrote:
I know of no reason why a name or a trade may not be built up for a song or bit of literature
as well as for any commodity ..... The whole secret of advertising is to make a name popular;
a slogan sells goods when many times their intrinsic value would create no demand ..... Here
the copyright on the song had expired, but this did not prevent the plaintiffs from having a
right to their rearrangement and the new name which they had given it, especially when
through much expenditure of money they had built up a demand for the song under that
name.'0
Neither Judge Crane nor Dr. Derenberg are impressed by the fact that "Uneeda" or
"Cremo" are means for identifying not crackers or cigars as such, but a particular
brand of crackers or cigars whereas the name of a song is a means of identifying the
song no matter by whom published. Were the defendant enjoined, he could not sell
that song, despite the fact that it was not copyrighted. The desirability of such a result is not self evident.
Nor can the relations between press and radio be determined simply on the basis of
an intuitive judgment that it is "unfair" for the radio to broadcast news taken from a
published newspaper within twenty-four hours of its publication. One need only place
himself in the position of a legislator subject to pressures from the variety of interests
concerned to realize the enormous difficulty of the problem." Similarly, the realistic
difficulties which deterred the Circuit Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit from
enjoining the imitation of a design of a dress fabric can hardly be dismissed with the
statement that "it does not necessarily follow from a lack of federal legislation that
a court of equity is prevented from recognizing a property right or property interest of
2
the plaintiff in the seasonal designs originated by him.""1
It does not follow necessarily,
of course. But it is a very good reason for a court's declining to exercise the legislative
function of determining first whether a "property right" is to be created at all and
second what safeguards and limitations are required in the public interest. Here, again,
the legislative concern with the problem for a number of years is indicative of the complexity of the problem.3 A common-sense judgment of "unfairness" is not a sufficient
N.Y. 86 (1932)], p. 1o8.
[9 F. Supp. 279 (Wash. 1934)], p. io 9 .
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standard for measuring trade practices. Nor are courts always appropriate bodies for
establishing the standards in the first place or for enforcing them in the second place.
In academic classification, Controlling Retailers and Economics of the Iron and Steel
Industry are not legal studies; they are economic studies. The difference is not, of
course, in basic subject matter or in relevance; for these are studies of legal controls of
business,--the operation of the N. R. A. codes in the two industries. The difference is
in the emphasis given to the subject matter by the authors. Trade-MarkInfringement
and Unfair Trading concentrates on legal doctrine employed in the regulation of business enterprise. The problems of the enterprise are assumed a priori. The economic
effects of the regulation through the doctrine and the desiderata of the regulation are
also assumed. The N.R.A. code studies, on the other hand, concentrate on analysis
of the business problems to which the regulation is directed, the desiderata of the regulation and the techniques and practical effects of the controls in operation. Any lawyer
who represented a client in the process of code draftiig or code administration knows
how much such economic studies are part of his business and how impossible it is for
him to accept the library classification and disregard economic studies as irrelevant to
law.
Dr. Mack's study is in five parts. Part I deals with the history of governmental
and co-operative control of merchandising prior to the summer of 1933 and "pictures
the attitudes, customs, and institutions inherited by those retailers who were the actors
in the N.R.A. experiment." Part II "tells the story of the drafting of the Retail Code."
Part III describes the "problems and processes of Code administration." Part IV surveys the effects of the Code and its administration on the several groups involved in the
industry. Part V makes an appraisal of the experiment and draws some general conclusions from it. Dr. Mack worked alone and brought to the study her personal experience as a member of the staff of the Retail Code Authority in the City of New York.
Economics of the Iron and Steel Industry is a co-operative study conducted by the
three authors with the aid of a research staff. Financial support for the study came
from The Brookings Institution, The Maurice and Laura Falk Foundation and the
University of Pittsburgh, the Falk Foundation supplying the major part of the support.
"In view of the highly controversial nature of the subject of the inquiry," the Director's
Preface states, no parts of the manuscript were seen by anyone connected with the
Foundation prior to publication. The study was initially "planned as one that would
have immediate and practical influence in connection with the determination of public
policy toward the Steel Code as one major example of the extensive code system set
up under the National Recovery Administration." 4 When the shochet killed the N.R.A.
eagle (disguised as a chicken),'s the study was continued for its significance as "an
objective analysis of the results of an experiment in industrial self-government." For,
as the Director says: "The Supreme Court decision did not solve the problems of this
basic industry; the Court merely rejected one attempt at solution. The problems for
which solutions were sought through the Steel Code antedate the Recovery Act, or
for that matter, the depression itself. For the most part, they remain today to plague
both industry and government. It is not unlikely, therefore, that other solutions will
be attempted in the future. From the beginning of the investigation it was recognized
that what was required in a study of the Steel Code was a comprehensive economic
14Vol. I, p. vi.
IS
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analysis of the iron and steel industry from the point of view of determining the necessity or the desirability of that Code or any other similar type of control. Consequently, this appraisal of the Steel Code is intended not merely as an historical treatment of
6
a Government experiment but as a constructive contribution."'
The study is divided into four parts. Part I, entitled "The Background," describes
the industry, its production and distribution "patterns" and its labor conditions, the
Steel Code and the administration of the Code. Part II deals with the production and
pricing problems under the Code,17 and Part III with labor relations and labor conditions under the Code. Part IV contains a summary of findings and conclusions. While
the study was a co-operative one conducted by a staff of persons, the responsibility
for final authorship was divided. Professor Daugherty wrote the labor sections. Professor de Chazeau wrote the sections on price and distribution. Professor Stratton
wrote the sections dealing with production, costs and earnings.
Here are two invaluable case studies of two widely different industries. Though
neither study neglects economic theory, both seek primarily to know and understand
the ways, the habits, and the problems of the enterprises under investigation. Both
bring within their focus all of the group interests involved in the industry and seek to
ascertain the effects of practices and controls on each of the interests. Both studies,
Steel to a much greater extent than Retailers, make use of statistical tables, curves
and charts; but both recognize the possibilities of deception in the seeming accuracy,
and the inadequacy of this information for true description or wise judgment.
The immediate objectives of the N.R.A. were industrial codes of "fair competition."
This was a technical concept. "Fair competition" in the N.R.A. codes was not the
converse of "unfair trading" which Dr. Derenberg studied. The codes were not to be
uniform rules of "fairness" imposed on industry generally, as the common law rules of
unfair competition seem to be. Each code of fair competition was to be a fairly comprehensive set of regulations for the industry with which it dealt, specially drafted and
adapted to meet the peculiar needs of that industry. Labor relations and labor conditions, which were completely excluded from the common law concept of unfair competition, were to be indispensable terms of the codes of fair competition. The codes
were not to be imposed from above but were to be the products of the co-operative
efforts of those concerned in the specific industries. The problems in steel were not
those in retailing; and the steel code, even with appropriate changes of language, would
make no sense in the retail trade. Each code is very properly, therefore, the subject of
separate study. Yet the two studies contain some lessons in common on the techniques
of control.
In each industry, the process of code drafting is described as a tug-of-war between
the several groups involved, employers, labor, "consumers," the government. But
within each group there was another tug-of-war. Indeed, when one is faced with concrete proposals, the group lines seem to fade and become distorted. In steel, the integrated company, the semi-integrated and non-integrated company, the furnace merchant and the specialized products manufacturer, each has special interests not shared
by the others and at times conflicting with those of the others. In retailing, the large
and small retailers, the big city and small town locations, the department store, chainstore, speciality, variety and neighborhood store,--each has interests which irk the
others. And within each classification, differences in institutional habits, personalities,
16Vol. I, p. vi.
17This
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and credos disrupt the real or apparent "unity" of interest. Even the initial problem
of industrial classification-the question of what businesses the "industry" includes or
excludes-turns out to be a problem of incredible complexity. The codes were, then,
the resultants of many pressures; and the strength of the pressures depended not merely on financial power, but on the personalities of the individuals in the fray, the degree
of organization, astuteness of strategy, sustained perseverance and the turns of fate.
Government representatives could do a good deal, but their effectiveness was limited
by their resources; and their resources in terms of personnel, time, organization, specialized knowledge and expertness were of necessity not abundant.
Both studies conclude that labor, largely because it was unorganized in both industries, received inadequate compensation for the privileges of self-government granted
by the Codes to the employers. Both studies point to the dangers of code administration by interested groups alone. Nominal government representation is not enough.
Effective supervision is required to make self-regulation serve the public interest. And
both studies warn against the danger of permitting power to become concentrated in
fact in the hands of one of the interested groups. The Retail Code, Dr. Mack concludes
in frank discouragement, attempted too ambitious a task. She generalizes that "legislation of the N.R.A. variety deals largely with a category of economic phenomena
which either cannot be controlled at all or controlled only at an excessive price.",' The
authors of the Steel study are not quite so pessimistic about social control in the iron
and steel industry. Their analysis and conclusions are confined to that industry and
they refuse to indulge in wider generalizations.
The N.R.A. was a grand effort. If it failed, one substantial cause was the lack of
detailed knowledge and information about industrial institutions to guide public policy
in the determination of standards and the invention of suitable techniques of control.
This need was being slowly supplied by the educating process of experience in the administration of the codes. The N.R.A. at the time of the Sczechter decision was not
the N.R.A. of 1933. The decision did not solve the problems to which the N.R.A.
was directed; and it did not kill the spirit of that legislation. We know now, more than
ever, the value of detailed knowledge of industrial conditions. Not simply economic
theorizing, "on the whole," "other things being equal" and "in the long run"; not
alone general figures and general averages which fit nothing in particular; but concrete
facts about the habits, practices and operations of specific industries and industrial
establishments. Though steel is a basic industry with a high degree of concentration,
a relatively small number of firms, a long history of co-operative effort in trade associations, and bushels of statistics, the authors of the Steel study repeat many times that
their analysis is hampered by a deplorable lack of "accurate data." They labored
mightily and well, but with "keen awareness" of the limits thus imposed. The lack is
not due to want of interest or to measures of economy. It is quite likely that "accurate
data" could be collected without increase of the expenditures now being made for
statistical compilations. The lack is due largely to traditions about "trade secrets"
and limitations on compilers of statistics. At one time it was hoped that the Federal
Trade Commission would fill the need. The N.R.A. made a beginning. But the field
is still open for government investigators and for university departments of economics
-or of law.
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